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1 The Mixed System of Scots Law 
a) General 
According to the prevalent and authoritative narrative among Scottish legal academics, 
Scotland has a mixed legal system, and it is the only mixed legal system in Europe. However, 
outside Scotland and outside other mixed jurisdictions, the mixed system of Scots law has 
unfortunately not received much attention.1 For a better understanding of this fairly cryptic 
account some background information is necessary. ‘Mixed system’ in this context is 
generally understood, in a somewhat reductionist way,2 as a mixture between Roman law-
based Civil Law (as found in the continental European Civil Law jurisdictions) and the 
Common Law of England. Thus this is conceptually a ‘simple mix’, whereby the law is a 
hybrid only of Civil Law and Common Law as its ingredients.3 ‘Mixed system’ also refers to 
private law and the commercial law-aspects of private law only; it does not cover all areas of 
Scots law, namely not criminal law, and it does not refer to public law (constitutional law and 
administrative law). With these restrictive caveats, the present definition of ‘mixed system’ 
can make sense, otherwise it would be problematic.  
But it is not the purpose of this article to discuss where the possible flaws of the idea 
of the ‘mixed system’ used by Scottish legal academics lie, for I want to show the purpose of 
the ‘mixed system’ conception in legal and political discourse, not its accuracy or otherwise. 
As a further methodological point, the following is presented from the perspective of an 
author with a Civil Law education and background from a Continental European Civil Law 
jurisdiction, with a Common Law education and background from England, and with 
practical experience of Scots law as a legal academic in Scotland for over ten years. Naturally 
                                                     
1 H. MacQueen, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence: Scotland’, 29 International Journal of Legal 
Information (2001), p. 310-311. 
2 A classical counter-example are the pluri-jural systems of African states, for example the usual pattern of 
indigenous customary laws, Islamic law and (English) Common Law in Commonwealth Africa, see e.g. A. 
Allott, Essays in African Law (Butterworth, 1960), p. 4-5, 12, 63, 67. In the case of the mixed system of South 
Africa, the concentration on purely the Civil Law (Roman-Dutch) part and the Common Law (English) part 
without considering the customary law element at all can lead to most uncomfortable findings, see below and A. 
Rahmatian, ‘Book Review: Vernon Valentine Palmer: Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal 
Family’, 8 Edinburgh Law Review (2004), p. 427-428; E. Örücü, ‘What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or 
Expansion?’, 3 Journal of Comparative Law (2008), p. 49. 
3 E. Örücü, 3 JCL (2008), p. 46. 
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this account is not only subjective, it also tends to be sceptical, especially as to the exact 
nature of this mixité from the viewpoint of someone with an intimate knowledge of the ‘pure’ 
Civil Law and the ‘pure’ Common Law. In the same way as pouring white wine into red wine 
does not create a rosé but a horrible concoction, the mixing of Civil Law and Common Law 
does not create anything new or better per se, and it may not create anything different from 
its constituent parts at all.4 Nevertheless, some Scots lawyers regard the mixed nature of 
Scots law as having a special, separate and independent quality, perhaps even superiority,5 
when compared to the Civil Law, and particularly to the Common Law, the ingredients out of 
which Scots Law has been formed. It cannot be avoided that the non-Scot often finds it 
difficult to discern such a quality, regardless of how sympathetic he or she is to the beliefs of 
Scottish colleagues.  
The historical reasons for the mixed nature of Scots law have often been presented 
and need not be retold.6 Of interest is rather an analysis of that mixed nature, but sometimes 
one cannot help thinking that the usually provided broad discussion of the historical 
development of mixed Scots law seeks to fill a certain analytical void.  
Perhaps one may start with an account of the generally accepted understanding of 
‘mixed system’ or the ‘Scots law mix’7 among Scots lawyers. Scots law before the Act of 
Union with England in 1707 was generally part of the Roman-law based ius commune of the 
European continent. There is the idea that English law encroached on Scots law mostly from 
that time onwards, exacerbated by the fact that in civil law matters the highest court of the 
country was the (English) House of Lords.8 But modern scholarship has shown that the 
influence of English law started much earlier than with the Union between Scotland and 
England, probably from the beginning of the development of both jurisdictions.9 Plans to 
unify Scots and English law after the Scots King James VI ascended to the throne in 1603 
failed, not least because England feared an imposition of the civil law. As of the early 
eighteenth century, Scots law was already a mixture between Scots law in the ius commune 
                                                     
4 A. Rahmatian, ‘Codification of Private Law in Scotland: Observations by a Civil Lawyer’, 8 Edinburgh Law 
Review (2004) p. 31-59, at p. 34. 
5 T. B. Smith, ‘The Common Law Cuckoo’, in T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (W. Green and 
Oceana Publications, 1962), p. 96-97, 115. Discussion also in K. Reid, ‘The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78(5) 
Tulane Law Review (2003), p. 5-40, at p. 13-14, 20. 
6 H. MacQueen, ‘Regiam Majestatem, Scots Law, and National Identity’, 74 no. 197 The Scottish Historical 
Review (1995), p. 1-25; W. Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified)’, 60 Louisiana Law Review (1999-2000), p. 677-738, at p. 684, and 688 (for Scotland). 
7 E. Reid (2013), ‘Mixed but Not Codified: The Case of Scotland’ (chapter 16), in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope 
and Structure of Civil Codes (Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice) (Springer, 2013), p. 
343-368, at p. 344. 
8 E.g. T. B. Smith, ‘The Common Law Cuckoo’, p. 92-93, and ‘English Influences on the Law of Scotland’, p. 
122-123, both in T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (W. Green and Oceana Publications, 1962). 
9 W. D. Sellar, ‘Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of Two Receptions’, 4 Edinburgh Law 
Review (2000), p. 3-18, at p. 4-7; H. MacQueen, 29 Int J Leg Info (2001), p. 310, with further references. 
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civil law tradition and English common law.10 The influence of English law on Scots law 
increased strongly in the nineteenth century, particularly in Victorian times with English case 
law and the introduction of principal commercial law statutes,11 such as the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893, which is essentially still in force as the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended). The 
exact relevance of the different elements of the mixture has always remained controversial 
among Scottish legal scholars. For some scholars Scots law is Civilian in its core, with 
influences and changes by English law, others consider it a genuine mix between both legal 
systems. Some emphasise that the mix contains important elements of Canon law and Scots 
customary law.12 If a tentative answer can be found at all, it would depend much on the 
historical period and on the particular area of the law in question. Here we also enter the 
debate about the interpretation of the legal ‘mixité’ by Scottish Legal Nationalism, which will 
be dealt with separately.13 The following examples illustrate how this ‘mixité’ is realised in 
practice in the law of obligations and the law of property. 
 
b) Contract 
The mixedness of civil and common law elements within Scots law is different in different 
subject areas. In contract law, the main source of law is case law (Scots ‘common law’) and 
custom. Partial statutorisation and quasi-codification14 of certain areas of contract law with 
statutes for the whole of the UK, such as the Consumer Credit Act 1974, Sale of Goods Act 
1979, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and now the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015, 
have shaped Scots contract law, although it is difficult to say whether these UK statutes can 
be regarded as distinctively ‘English’ imports. Within the Scots common law (case law) of 
contract, Scots law is different from English law in relation to some specific points: the 
absence of the doctrine of consideration, the recognition of contracts for the benefit of third 
parties (in England only since the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 199915), the 
primary remedy of ‘specific implement’ (specific performance) as opposed to mere damages 
for breach of contract (although Scottish legal practice differs little from England16), the 
absence of a distinction of contractual terms between conditions (fundamental terms, leading 
                                                     
10 E. Reid, in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, p. 346. 
11 A. Rodger, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ 108 Law Quarterly Review (1992), p. 
570-590. 
12 E. Reid, in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, p. 346, 351, for an impartial overview. 
See also W. D. Sellar, 4 Edin L R (2000), p. 12, 16.  
13 Below under 2. 
14 On the terminology one can adopt, see A. Rahmatian, 8 EdinLR (2004), p. 50. 
15 However, in English law commercial relations of this kind could be emulated by the trust in many cases, and 
there have long been special statutory rules for insurance agreements, being the really practical case of contracts 
for the benefit of third parties (e.g. s. 11 Married Women’s Property Act 1882). 
16 H. MacQueen, J. Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (4th edition, Bloomsbury Professional, 2016), 252-253. 
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to rescission of the contract in case of a breach) and warranties (allowing damages only for 
breach).17  
Some areas of contract law are a clear mixture of Scots and English law, for example 
the law of error, but in this case the mixture is an unfortunate muddle.18 The reason is that in 
the nineteenth century Scots law imported the English concept of misrepresentation,19 a part 
of the law of tort (although it appears in the context of the formation of contracts20), while the 
‘classical’ Scots law of error is conceptually a part of contract, because its idea is being a 
remedy that deals with a defect in consensus in the contract formation process. With this idea 
of ‘error’ as a flawed and remediable consensus, Scots contract law is Civilian: it focuses on 
the erring party, while in the originally tortious English law remedy of misrepresentation the 
focus is on the misrepresenting party.21 As the Civilian concept of error and the English 
concept of misrepresentation are irreconcilable, Scottish courts in reality consider error cases 
strictu sensu as misrepresentation cases or, depending on the facts and interpretation, 
situations of error are dealt with as breach of contract events, without touching the complex 
area of error at all.22 This approach is, of course, influenced by English law, in contrast to the 
Civil law systems in Continental Europe which distinguish more clearly between defects in 
formation and defects in performance of the contract, and organise their remedies 
accordingly.23 
 
c) Delict (Tort) 
With regard to torts, Scots law of delict, as is the correct name, is indeed a law of tort, not a 
law of a number of torts, so there is an overarching principle of extra-contractual liability and 
reparation. This overarching principle is based on the Roman law actio legis Aquiliae, as 
developed further by the ius commune, particularly by the usus modernus pandectarum in the 
seventeenth century.24 In theory this is important, because Scots lawyers may interpret the 
case law, which is the principal source of Scots law in delict (as in contract), not 
incrementally on a case-by-case basis, but against a certain intellectual framework. In 
                                                     
17 E. Reid, in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, p. 359; H. MacQueen, J. Thomson, 
Contract Law in Scotland, p. 138-139. 
18 W. W. McBryde, ‘Error’, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 2 
(Obligations) (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 72. 
19 H. MacQueen, 29 Int J Leg Info (2001), p. 316.  
20 J. Cartwright, Contract Law (2nd ed., Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 174, 177. 
21 A. Rahmatian, 8 EdinLR (2004), p. 42. 
22 See example by W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd ed., Thomson/W. Green, 2007), p. 
406.  
23 E.g. in Germany, see §§ 117, 119, 122, 123 German BGB (defects in formation: error, fraud, duress etc.), §§ 
320ff, § 434 BGB etc. (defects in performance). 
24 H. MacQueen and W. D. Sellar, ‘Negligence’, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 517-547, at p. 521-524. 
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practice this is rather irrelevant, especially with regard to the tort of negligence as by far the 
most important tort.  
The example of the tort or delict of negligence shows that there are essential areas of 
private law which differ practically not at all in England and in Scotland.25 In such areas the 
idea of a ‘mixed system’ becomes very difficult indeed to ascertain. This is demonstrated by 
the fundamental negligence case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, the case that states the famous 
general duty of care rule in the form of the ‘neighbour principle’.26 In the view of some 
writers Scots law has influenced English law here.27 It is true, the case originated in Paisley 
(Glasgow), but then its Scottish pedigree becomes more obscure. All judges, also the 
otherwise dissenting ones, proceeded on the basis that English and Scots law on negligence 
were already the same at that time.28 It has been shown that Lord Atkin probably convinced 
the Scottish judge Lord Macmillan to delete all references to Scottish authorities in the 
second draft of his speech to make it an unquestionable precedent also for English law,29 but 
there is divided opinion about the interpretation of this finding. One view regards this as a 
proof that the Scottish authorities would not have added much to the ruling and could 
therefore be omitted,30 while others see this act as showing that the formulation of a general 
principle of liability for negligence (in its degree new to English law) in fact constituted the 
Scottish contribution,31 especially Lord Macmillan’s reference in his first draft to the 
institutional writer Erskine (1773).32 Erskine’s mentioning of a ‘neighbour’ in the context of a 
(general?33) delictual liability rule was considered to be the likely cornerstone of Lord 
                                                     
25 E. Reid, in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, p. 362. 
26 [1932] AC 562, 1932 SC (HL) 31. It can safely be assumed that the facts and ruling of this case are well 
known and need not be discussed in the present context, see e.g. S. F. Deakin et al., Markesinis and Deakin’s 
Tort Law (5th edition, Clarendon Press, 5th ed, 2003), p. 75; W. V. H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (15th 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1998), p. 94. For an extensive treatment of its history, see W. W. McBryde, ‘The 
story of the “snail in the bottle” case’, in P. T. Burns and S. J. Lyons (eds), Donoghue v. Stevenson and the 
modern Law of Negligence. The Paisley Papers (The Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 
1991), p. 25. 
27 E.g. R. Leslie, ‘Scotland (Report 2)’, in V. V. Palmer (ed.), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 240, at p. 250; R. Evans-Jones, ‘Roman Law in Scotland and England and the 
development of one law for Britain’, 115 Law Quarterly Review (1999), p. 605, 618. 
28 Per Lord Buckmaster, [1932] AC 562, at 566-567, per Lord Atkin, at 579, per Lord Thankerton, at 602-603, 
per Lord Macmillan, at 608-609. Lord Tomlin agreed with Lord Buckmaster in every respect, at 599. 
29 A. Rodger, ‘Lord Macmillan’s speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson’, 108 Law Quarterly Review (1992) p. 236, 
246-247. 
30 A. Rodger, 108 LQR (1992), p. 242. 
31 R. Evans-Jones, 115 LQR (1999), p. 624. 
32 J. Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland (Bell, 1773), Book III, 1, 13, p. 415: ‘[E]very one who has the 
exercise of reason, and so can distinguish between right and wrong, is naturally obliged to make up the damage 
befalling his neighbour from a wrong committed by himself.’ This passage has been considered as the first 
reference to the neighbour principle.  
33 Whether there was a general principle of delictual liability for negligence in the 17th and 18th centuries in 
Scots law is controversial, arguably not, see D. Visser and N. Whitty, ‘The Structure of the Law of Delict’, in K. 
Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
p. 422, 438. See also W. J. Stewart, Delict (4th edition, Thomson/Green, 2004), p.  9 with further references. 
6 
 
Atkin’s definition of the neighbour principle.34 Traces of a more generalising approach to 
liability for negligence can also be found at about the same time with Lord Kames (1778).35  
General principles, even with regard to negligence, are not confined to Civil Law and 
mixed legal systems, such as that of Scotland. In English law, Le Lievre v. Gould36 (limiting 
the general principle in Heaven v. Pender37 by the notion of proximity), on which particularly 
Lord Atkin relied in his speech,38 already contained a kernel of a general principle of duty of 
care based on proximate relationship. It is also questionable whether the approaches of the 
‘English’ (rather: Welsh) Lord Atkin and the ‘Scottish’ Lord Macmillan in Donoghue show 
any significant difference in effect.39 US-American lawyers may point to the slightly earlier 
Palsgraf case before the Court of Appeals of New York in 1928,40 where a similar principled 
approach to liability for negligence was taken. 
Whatever the exact situation was then in the making of Donoghue, one may say that it 
is ‘certainly not impossible that the Scots law played an important role in reassuring the 
majority that a generalised principle of delictual liability – with proper limits – could indeed 
be formulated’,41 but that in effect does not change much in the present context of the 
discussion. If the contribution of Scots law to English law in Donoghue lies in the principled 
approach to the law of negligence (as opposed to an incremental approach in the English 
common law42), then the resulting neighbour principle can be seen as somewhat at odds with 
Scots law itself. As already said, in ‘classical’ Scots law delictual liability is indeed based on 
the principles of the actio legis Aquiliae43 (in the shape of the usus modernus) in accordance 
with the legal tradition of the Civil Law systems.44 In the Civilian tradition, liability is 
founded on the general concept (‘damnum iniuria datum’) that compensation for a loss or 
damage (damnum45) has to be made if it has been caused (in the sense of a condicio sine qua 
                                                     
34 R. Evans-Jones, 115 LQR (1999), p. 624. 
35 Kames (H. Home), Sketches of the History of Man, Vol. IV, Book III, Sketch II (Principles and progress of 
morality), Section 6 (Laws respecting reparation) (2nd edition, Strahan and Cadell, 1778), p. 66: ‘... an action is 
culpable or faulty, if the consequent mischief was foreseen or might have been foreseen; and the actor ... is 
subject to reparation.”, and at p. 69: ‘What is said upon culpable actions, is equally applicable to culpable 
omissions ...’. See also A. Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh University Press, 
2015), p. 85-87, with further references. 
36 [1893] 1 QB 491 at 497, 502, 504. 
37 (1883) 11 QBD 503 at 509. 
38 [1932] AC 562 at 580-581, 582. 
39 D. J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 191. 
40 Helen Palsgraf v The Long Island Railroad Company 248 NY 339, per Cardozo C.J, at 341-342, 344. 
41 See D. Visser and N. Whitty, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
vol. 2, p. 461. 
42 Compare Lord Buckmaster’s dissenting speech, [1932] AC 562 at 567, 577-578. 
43 The classical Roman law statement of the Lex Aquilia is in D. 9, 2, 1 pr; D. 9, 2, 2 pr.; D. 9, 2, 27, 5. 
44 H. MacQueen and W. D. Sellar, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
vol. 2, p. 517, 519. 
45 The compensation was then also split into two categories of calculation, damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans which survive in present codifications today, e.g. in Austria §§ 1293, 1323, 1331, 1332 ABGB. 
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non) by an unlawful (iniuria) and culpable (culpa) act.46 The aquilian liability rests on culpa 
(fault). However, in the era of Natural Law attempts were made to develop a principle of 
strict liability on the basis of alterum non laedere, but these theories did not succeed.47 The 
fault-based aquilian system was the concept which prevailed in the Civil Law countries, 
especially owing to Savigny and the Pandectists in Germany in the 19th century.48 The 
neighbour principle in Donoghue, even if it is indeed rooted in some way in Scots law, is not 
in line with the Lex Aquilia, because it is not strictly speaking fault-based, but establishes a 
general rule of an actual duty of care owed to a certain group of persons,49 and that is the 
foundation of a compensation claim if the breach of that duty has caused damage. In Civilian 
terminology one could say that the Common Law duty of care principle establishes that the 
breach of duty is an unlawful (but not necessarily also culpable) act (iniuria) which, for that 
reason, triggers liability, while culpa (in the narrow meaning of ‘negligence’) under the 
aquilian system establishes liability for negligent acts because they are also culpable acts 
(culpa in the wide sense of ‘fault’). The Scots law on negligence as it went into Donoghue 
was then a Scots Common Law, not the aquilian Scots Civil Law. This Scots Common Law 
rule emerged as a result of a convergence of Scots and English laws in the nineteenth century 
in this area, when there was a rise of negligence cases as a result of the industrialisation.50 
Thus if Donoghue contains a Scots law contribution, then it is not a clearly discernable result 
of the Civilian tradition which is supposed to be the distinguishing factor in relation to 
English law, and which is the essential ingredient that creates the ‘mixed system’ of Scots 
law.   
 
d) Property 
While the Scots law of obligations has been shaped profoundly by English law, Scots 
property law is essentially Civilian in nature. One can take the view that, taken in isolation, 
Scots property law is not really ‘mixed’ at all because it is Roman in its conception. Its 
fundamental concepts, such as real rights, traditio, possessio, accessio, originate from Roman 
                                                     
46 Culpa (fault) can be in the form of dolus (intention), or culpa in its narrow meaning (negligence). The 
terminology in the discussion of the aquilian liability over the centuries was not consistent, see R. Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1004 (iniuria and culpa in classical Roman law), p. 
1027 (meaning of culpa in the usus modernus). 
47 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 1033; N. Jansen, ‘Duties and rights in negligence: A comparative 
and historical perspective on the European law of extracontractual liability’, 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(2004), p. 443, 452, 456 (on such an approach by Hugo Grotius in his Inleiding only). 
48 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 1034; N. Jansen, 3 OJLS (2004), p. 459. 
49 This ‘idealistic’ view of a duty of care is, however, disputed, see discussion of the ‘idealist’ N. J. McBride, 
‘Duties of Care – Do they really exist?’, 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004), p. 417, 418. The other group 
which McBride calls ‘cynics’ maintains that ‘duty of care’ means only that a person will be liable for causing 
damage by negligence in a particular situation.  
50 MacQueen, Hector and Sellar, W. David H. (2000), in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of 
Private Law in Scotland, vol. 2, p. 544, 546. 
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law.51 In particular, it embodies the idea of a single and indivisible dominium as ownership 
and absolute entitlement, instead of the English concept of title with (theoretically) relative 
entitlements, whereby the strongest of competing titles prevails, and whereby the entitlement 
is defended by torts (especially trespass and conversion).52 The Civilian method for the 
protection of property is the rei vindicatio (action of delivery), but Scots law has not adopted 
the rei vindicatio in the strict sense.53 More recent antiquarian and historicising discussions to 
revive the ancient Scots law remedy of spuilzie (unlawful taking away or meddling with 
movables in another’s – owner’s or lawful possessor’s – possession and without the owner’s 
consent)54 have had no effect.55 The idea is to re-establish spuilzie, itself probably a further 
development from the actio spolii of canon law,56 to create an equivalent to a rei vindicatio 
and to make Scots property law more ‘Civilian’.  
The most important feature of Scots property law is the absence of a division between 
legal and equitable ownership that is characteristic of English property law.57 The English 
trust is founded on this legal concept of simultaneous different qualities of ownership.58 
Hence Scots law does not have an institute that is equivalent to the English trust. What is 
called ‘trust’ in Scots law is really a kind of extended fiducia based on contract, in that the 
trust property may be conceptualised as being held as a special patrimony (a discrete estate) 
separate from the general patrimony of the trustee, so that the creditors of an insolvent trustee 
are also bound by the entitlement of the beneficiary to that special patrimony. Furthermore, 
Scottish trust law recognises real (proprietary) subrogations, so that the proceeds of sale 
obtained for trust property sold become part of the trust property.59 There is, however, no 
clear statement of the Scottish courts as yet that has adopted the academic analysis of general 
and special patrimony.  
In summary, Scots property law can only form an ingredient for the making of the 
mixed system of Scots law, if, rather arbitrarily, the law of obligations is also added to the 
mix.  
                                                     
51 E. Reid, in J. C. Rivera (ed.), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, p. 357. 
52 F. H. Lawson, B. Rudden, The Law of Property (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 68; M. Bridge, 
Personal Property Law (4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 80, 86. 
53 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (Butterworth, 1996), para. 158, p. 129-130; J. Stair, The Institutions 
of the Law of Scotland, David M. Walker (ed.), (The University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1981) (1st 
ed. 1681), IV, 3, 45, p. 830. 
54 J. Thomson, Delictual Liability (4th edition, Tottel, 2009), p. 5, 26. 
55 Very occasionally spuilzie resurfaces, see A. Rodger, ‘Spuilzie in the Modern World’, Scots Law Times 
(News) (1970), p. 33; C. Anderson, ‘Spuilzie today’, 38 Scots Law Times (2008), p. 257-260. 
56 J. W. Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, in R. Zimmermann and K. Reid (eds.), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 73. 
57 M. Bridge, Personal Property Law, p. 6-10. 
58 F. H. Lawson and B. Rudden, The Law of Property, p. 86, 94. 
59 G. Gretton, ‘Trusts without Equity’, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000), p. 599, 606, 
609-610, 614. 
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Thus the conception of ‘mixed system’ can be administered quite flexibly; it can be 
tailored in a broader way (property law with the laws of contract and delict), or more 
narrowly (within contract, for example the law of error), or may even be postulated as having 
an inverse effect (Scots law influencing English law, and not even a ‘classical’ Civilian 
concept that is normally supposed to characterise Scots law, but a Scots Common Law idea 
of some kind, such as in the tort/delict of negligence). One starts to notice that the idea of the 
‘mixed system’ of Scots law is not only the result of a disinterested analysis of a status quo of 
facts, but also a passionate social construct of legal scholarship, or of outright politics. 
 
 
2 The Ideological Undercurrents: The Idea of Scottish Legal Nationalism  
 
a) The features of Scottish Legal Nationalism and examples from private law 
The emphasis on the mixed nature of Scots law (being understood in its narrow meaning as a 
mix of Civil and Common Law) as the distinctive characteristic is mostly the product of 
Scottish Legal Nationalism. This movement emerged in the late 1950s, and was strongly 
represented particularly at Scottish law faculties, with T. B. Smith (1915-1988) as its leading 
academic figure.60 Ten years ago Scottish Legal Nationalism was still dominant in Scottish 
law faculties, but it seems to have started waning in the last few years. A description of 
Scottish Legal Nationalism in a nutshell is best left to its detractors, who could provide a 
pointed and perhaps exaggerated, but concise and in my experience accurate description of 
this phenomenon – something which T. B. Smith and his followers with their penchant for 
legal and historical mysticism, sonorous affectation and with their almost meticulous 
imprecision apparently never quite managed to achieve with satisfactory clarity. In his well-
known critical summary in 1976 the late Ian Willock identified the following hallmarks of the 
ideology of Scottish Legal Nationalism: Scots law, characterised by an adherence to principle 
rather than precedent, reflects authentically a Scottish Volksgeist, and Scottish juristic writers 
and judges have a duty to voice these qualities. The influence of English law through the UK 
                                                     
60 A principal text is T. B. Smith, ‘Strange Gods: The Crisis of Scots Law as a Civilian System’, in T. B. Smith, 
Studies Critical and Comparative (W. Green and Oceana Publications, 1962), 72, 81, 88. Beside T. B. Smith 
was the judge Lord Cooper of Culross (Thomas Mackay Cooper) (1892-1955), Lord President of the Court of 
Session, the most prominent representative of Scottish Legal Nationalism in the Scottish Legal Profession, see 
T. Cooper, The Scottish Legal Tradition, S. C. Styles (ed.) (The Saltire Society and the Stair Society, 1991), p. 
87-89. But Scottish Legal Nationalism was always less popular with the pragmatic legal practitioners. 
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Parliament and the House of Lords (Supreme Court) endangers the integrity of Scots law 
which needs to be saved. In particular:61 
 
‘The salvation of Scots law lies [for Scottish Legal Nationalism] in drawing upon its own historical 
roots and upon the experience of other “mixed” systems, such as those of South Africa and Louisiana, 
where too a basically Roman civilian system is threatened by infiltration from other legal traditions. 
[...] Scots law has a destiny to be a bridge between the common law and civilian systems within the 
European community.’ 
 
The modern discourse of Legal Nationalism has qualified the idea of the ‘hostile 
encroachment’ of English law on Scots law considerably, in that now it is generally 
acknowledged that the influence of English law started well before the Union between 
England and Scotland,62 and that the English influence can be regarded as enriching Scots 
law and is not a corrosive force. But other ideas still reign unabated today: (i) the idea that 
Scottish legal academic writing and especially Scottish Institutional Writers (authoritative 
textbook writers) are still a valuable source of law63 even 200-300 years after their works 
were published, (ii) that there is a family of apparently similar ‘mixed systems’ (Quebec, 
Louisiana, South Africa) despite their completely different and hardly comparable historical 
origin, (iii) that Scots law has a mission, due to its unique ‘mixité’, to pose as a role model for 
harmonisation or even legal unification of private law in the European Union. And (iv) there 
is the notion of the Volksgeist, although ostensibly denied,64 but very present in reality, 
though as a primitive version and rather in the spirit of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries which bears little resemblance to Savigny’s idea of the Volksgeist.65  
It must also be mentioned briefly that the concept of the ‘mixed system’ is white and 
Western, a point that is particularly delicate with regard to South Africa, often seen as the 
most important similar jurisdiction to Scotland concerning the ‘mixed system’ concept.66 
During the Apartheid era, the African customary laws were naturally and self-evidently 
omitted from the conception of a ‘mix’ between Civilian Roman-Dutch and Common Law in 
South Africa, and that had never been questioned by Scottish legal academics. But this 
exclusionist definition carried on in the international discourse of mixed systems, indeed as 
                                                     
61 I. D. Willock, ‘The Scottish Legal Heritage Revisited’, in J. P. Grant (ed.), Independence and Devolution. The 
Legal Implications for Scotland (W. Green, 1976), p. 1-14, at p. 4. 
62 W. D. Sellar, 4 EdinLR (2000), p. 3-18. 
63 T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (W. Green, 1962), p. 32-33, 113. 
64 See G. L. Gretton, ‘The Rational and the National: Thomas Broun Smith’, in E. Reid and D. Carey Miller 
(eds.), A Mixed Legal System in Transition (Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 30-43, at p. 35.  
65 For a discussion, see A. Rahmatian, ‘Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s Beruf and Volksgeistlehre’, 28(1) Journal 
of Legal History (2007), p. 4, 26-27. 
66 D. Carey Miller, ‘Sibling Mixed Systems: Reviewing South African/Scottish Comparative Law’, 20 
Edinburgh Law Review (2016), p. 257. 
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late as 2001 at least, when a book entitled ‘Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide’ appeared that 
omitted the customary law component in the South African country report entirely and did 
not mention Botswana and Zimbabwe at all, although both countries have the same ‘mixed 
system’ situation as South Africa.67 This disturbing segregating element of the mixed system 
idea, both conceptually and practically, which one may regard as inherent in the present 
Scottish ‘mixed system’ conception rather than as an undesired side-effect, has not been 
considered as a problem to the present day. 
Another revealing analysis about the nationalistic functionalisation of Scots law 
comes from Alexander McCall Smith (who later became a well-known fiction writer), also in 
1976:68 
 
‘[Scots] law has itself become the object of a … myth. Maintained after the Union as a focal point of 
Scottish identity it rapidly became a museum piece even escaping, until comparatively recently, the 
attentions of historical jurisprudence. After the heyday of anglicising influence Scots law became 
something of a political football, the object of fierce and in some cases unquestioning loyalty. … It is 
hardly surprising … that Scots law has struck a defensive position during the 20th century. At the time 
when other legal systems were undergoing rapid transformation to equip them to deal with the demands 
of modern conditions, Scots law suffered from conservative courts, inadequate legislative attention and 
a paucity of academic commentary and criticism. Although “legal nationalism” tends to accomplish 
nothing in concrete terms it could hardly be regarded as an unexpected reaction to the insensitive 
treatment that the law had received.’ 
 
There is no longer paucity of academic commentary and high quality scholarship in Scotland 
forty years later, but the problems of criticism, of conservative courts and inadequate 
legislative attention have remained valid points, despite the fact that Scotland has its own 
legislature for Scots law since devolution in 1999.69 Also the defensive position in favour of 
Scots law which Scottish legal academics tend to take up has not changed much. A fairly 
recent example of this attitude is the debate around the House of Lords case of Sharp v. 
Thompson in 1997.  
In Sharp v. Thomson,70 the (simplified) facts were that the buyer of a flat paid the 
purchase price and was let into possession, but the registration of the buyer’s ownership in 
the land register got delayed. Before registration took place, the seller became insolvent. 
Since conveyance of ownership has formally not been completed before registration, the 
seller’s receivers could claim the flat for the seller’s estate, through the operation of an 
                                                     
67 V. V. Palmer (ed.), Mixed Legal Systems Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 7-10, 24, 32-33, 
88-95, 178-181. Criticism by A. Rahmatian, 8 EdinLR (2004), p. 428-429. 
68 A. McCall Smith, ‘Scots Law in Comparative Context’, in J. P. Grant (ed.), Independence and Devolution. 
The Legal Implications for Scotland (W. Green, 1976), p. 153-161, at p. 153-154. 
69 Scotland Act 1998, ss. 28-30, 63A and schedule 5. 
70 1997 SC (HL) 66. 
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existing floating charge which had crystallised due to the insolvency. The Scottish Court of 
Session, both at first and second instance, decided that the flat would be caught by the 
floating charge since the flat still belonged to the seller at the time of the insolvency.71 The 
House of Lords reversed this decision, in that the flat was no longer part of the seller’s assets 
and the buyers took the flat free of the floating charge. The House of Lords effectively argued 
that the seller is strictly speaking still the owner of the flat, but in a case like this, one has to 
look at the substance, not the form only: here the seller retains the form of ownership, but he 
has lost the substance. So the flat is no longer the ‘property’ of the seller and not subject to 
the floating charge.72   
Scottish legal academics noticed quickly that this argumentation derived essentially 
from the English law of equity,73 something that has no equivalent in Scots law.74 The shrill 
outcry against this decision among Scots lawyers was remarkable and heartfelt. Two 
statements may be given as a pars pro toto for the debate: ‘“What is the ratio of Sharp v. 
Thomson?” became a favourite examination question. It was unanswerable as a Zen koan, 
but, unlike a koan, there was no bliss of enlightenment.’75 And: ‘In Sharp v. Thomson the 
problems caused by the floating charge came within an ace of destroying Scottish property 
law.’76 It needs to be added here that the floating charge is itself a creature of equity and an 
import into Scots law from English law by statute in 1961.77 
On the basis of the later case Burnett’s Trustee v. Grainger,78 the decision in Sharp 
has been interpreted as being restricted in authority and only applicable to the special 
situation of floating charges. Thus the story of Sharp v. Thomson was essentially the story of 
saving Scots property law from being ‘polluted’ by English law and, effectively, from 
becoming mixed. The answer whether this has been achieved by the nationalistic posturing of 
various academics or simply by the reasonable consideration that an essentially desirable 
legal outcome must be reconciled with the principles of the legal system in which this goal is 
to be attained, depends mostly on the ideological position of the commentator. 
Another battlefield of Scottish Legal Nationalism is the floating charge itself (a 
security right over a class of fluctuating moveable assets of a company, such as stock), 
                                                     
71 1994 SC 503, 1995 SC 455. 
72 Discussion following K. Reid, ‘Jam Today: Sharp in the House of Lords’, 10 Scots Law Times (1997), p. 80 
73 E.g. K. Reid, 10 SLT (1997), p. 82; G. L. Gretton, ‘Floating Charge in Scots Law: The Saga Continues’, 
Journal of Business Law (1995), p. 213-214. 
74 On the alien notion of the beneficial interest in Scots property law as introduced by Sharp, see Reid, 78(5) 
Tulane Law Review (2003), p. 34. 
75 G. L. Gretton, ‘Analysis: Ownership and Insolvency: Burnett’s Trustee v. Grainger’, 8 Edinburgh Law 
Review, p. 391. 
76 G. L. Gretton, in E. Reid and D. Carey Miller (eds.), A Mixed Legal System in Transition, p. 41. 
77 Companies (Floating Charges) (Scotland) 1961. 
78 2004 SC (HL) 19. 
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originally an import from English law79 and growing out of the English law of equity, as has 
been said before in the context of Sharp v. Thomson. Some authors were therefore in favour 
of the abolition of the floating charge in Scotland.80 Since the Scottish system of property law 
follows the principles of Roman law, the English concept of the floating charge is 
incompatible with Scots law, because the floating charge enables a lender to obtain security 
over a category of moveable assets (even incorporeal ones, like book debts) or over all 
moveable assets of a company without determining the individual assets at the time of the 
grant of the security right and without the requirement of actual delivery. That is in contrast 
to the requirements of Roman law-based security rights over moveable property, especially 
the pledge.81 The introduction of the floating change into Scots law was prompted by 
practical commercial considerations.82 Nevertheless it has been argued that the floating 
charge is incompatible with Scots property law, and its effects should be emulated by 
methods that fit the principles of the ‘mixed system’ of Scots law (which is with regard to 
property law rather Roman and not much mixed). It has also been said that the creation of a 
security right without delivery can be achieved with other forms of non-possessory security 
rights that Civil law systems recognise. There are, however, not many equal ones.83 
Furthermore, Scots law could be adapted (by legal reform) so as to accommodate the 
desirable security right over incorporeal assets, especially book debts, by other means than 
the floating charge.84 It appears that the argumentation against the floating charge hinges less 
on the commercial effects of the floating charge but on the technical-legal origin from 
English law. Where Scots law is currently unable to deliver the features of the floating 
charge, legal reform is proposed, mostly in line with perceived Civil law principles.85 
A further point of conflict among Scottish legal nationalists is the question whether 
the transfer of ownership is abstract or causal in Scots property law. Seemingly an extremely 
technical question of private law, it nevertheless provides material for a debate. Scots 
property law, being based on Roman law, distinguishes clearly between contract and 
conveyance as the two separate requirements for the transfer of property rights.86 Under Scots 
common law, passing of ownership is supposedly abstract, that is, detached from the 
                                                     
79 D. Cabrelli, ‘The Case against the Floating Charge in Scotland’, 9 Edinburgh Law Review (2005), p. 411-
414).  
80 G. Gretton, JBL (1995), p. 212. At least sympathetic to abolition also D. Cabrelli, 9 EdinLR (2005), p. 408. 
81 B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 151. 
82 D. Cabrelli, 9 EdinLR (2005), p. 409, 415. 
83 D. Cabrelli, 9 EdinLR (2005), p. 421, states the South African ‘notarial bond’ as an alternative. Such legal 
institutes may be found in a ‘mixed system’ but are not characteristic of a Civilian system. A similar institution 
(creation of security through formal acts of writing) is that of the English security bill of sale, see M. Bridge, 
Personal Property Law, p. 302-304.  
84 D. Cabrelli, 9 EdinLR (2005), p. 424. 
85 One theoretical example D. Cabrelli, 9 EdinLR (2005), p. 431, makes is the abolition of the floating charge in 
England and in Scotland and a new harmonizing law which would then have to be consistent with a Civilian 
model (which one?) to be acceptable for Scots law – an unrealistic scenario. 
86 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (Butterworths, 1996), para. 606, p. 483-484. 
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underlying contract directed at passing ownership. Thus Scots lawyers maintain that the 
conveyance of real rights in Scots law is only dependent on (a) the common intention to pass 
ownership (abstract real contract), and (b) delivery, but not on the validity of the contract.87 
Somewhat anachronistically, some modern Scottish authors refer to Savigny in this regard.88 
As regards immoveable (‘heritable’) property, the abstract nature of the conveyance has 
never been questioned89 with reference to the institutional writer Stair (1681).90 As to 
moveable property, the abstract nature of the transfer of ownership in Scots law is not entirely 
without doubt, because the authorities (institutional writers and court cases) are not very clear 
about this point if they discuss it at all.91 However, some authors are adamant about the 
abstract nature of the transfer of ownership even as to moveable property,92 and some authors 
have qualified the relevance of iusta causa traditionis to reconcile it better with Scots law.93  
The reason behind these endeavours is that, when the ‘English’ Sale of Goods Act94 
became part of Scots law in 1893, it upset the existing system of transfer of ownership under 
Scots common law. The Sale of Goods Act provides that ownership in (specific) goods 
passes when the parties intend it to pass (s. 17), and that is, by default, but subject to parties’ 
agreement, when the contract is made (s. 18, rule 1). This consensual (and therefore causal95) 
system of transfer of ownership not only ignores the distinction between abstract and causal 
conveyance, but lets the two carefully separated components of contract and conveyance in 
                                                     
87 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 609, p. 486-487; D. L. Carey Miller, ‘Systems of property: 
Grotius and Stair’, in D. L. Carey Miller and D. W. Meyers (eds.), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots 
Law. A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC, (Butterworths, 1992), p. 13, 30. 
88 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 608, p. 485; D. L. Carey Miller, in D. L. Carey Miller and D. 
W. Meyers (eds.), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law, p. 29. On Savigny’s abstract real contract 
doctrine, see A. Rahmatian, 28(1) JLH (2007), p. 14. 
89 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 611, p. 488. 
90 J. Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, D. M. Walker (ed.) (The University Presses of Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, 1981), Book II, 3, 14, p. 337: “narratives expressing the cause of the disposition [i.e. conveyance, 
transfer deed], are never enquired into, because though there were no cause, the disposition is good …”.  
91 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 609, p. 486, with further discussion and references. D. Carey 
Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (Thomson/W. Green, 2005), p. 141, 147-149. Even today the 
question of abstractness is not always expressly discussed, e.g. in some textbooks on property law, see T. 
Guthrie, Scottish Property Law, (2nd edition, Tottel, 2005), p. 47-48. In contrast, G. L. Gretton and A. J. Steven, 
Property, Trusts and Succession, (2nd edition, Bloomsbury Professional, 2013), p. 37, discuss this issue. 
92 Especially T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, p. 539. G. L. Gretton and A. J. Steven, 
Property, Trusts and Succession, p. 38, consider the abstract conveyance applicable to moveable property. K. 
Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 609, p. 487, also shows a clear preference to the abstract 
conveyance.  
93 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 608, p. 486; W. M. Gordon, ‘The importance of the justa 
causa of traditio’, in P. Birks (ed.), New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas 
(Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 123. 
94 Now Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54. 
95 The consensual conveyance is arguably a subset of the causal conveyance, because the consensus is 
incorporated in (and creates) a contract, and that is also the cause (iusta causa traditionis). Compare the similar 
situation in French law, art. 1138 (1) CC. 
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Scots law collapse into one as the principal rule.96 For these and other reasons97 the 
provisions of ss. 17 and 18 of the Sale of Goods Act are often still considered as an alien 
English element within Scots law.98 What is the reason for this opinion, given that the Sale of 
Goods Act was enacted in Scotland well over a hundred years ago and the extension of the 
English Sale of Goods Bill to Scotland was welcomed at the time?99 Furthermore, most 
ownership transfers of chattels are effected under the Sale of Goods Act,100 so there is little 
space for Scots common law in practice. As to the passing of ownership at the point of the 
contract, a Scottish textbook in 1896 remarked that ‘[t]his state of facts exists in the great 
majority of sales, so that in ordinary circumstances it may be stated that the old theoretical 
law has been abolished’.101 Even the technicality of the separate abstract conveyance, which 
is far less important in legal reality than theoreticians may think,102 seems to represent some 
ammunition for Scottish Legal Nationalism and is used to assert the Scottish position against 
England. One may speculate whether Scots lawyers would embrace a causal conveyance if 
the conveyance in English law were abstract.  
 
b) Practical sociological aspects of Scottish Legal Nationalism 
McCall Smith’s assertion that ‘“legal nationalism” tends to accomplish nothing in concrete 
terms’ remains quite attractive. There is, however, one aspect in which Scottish Legal 
Nationalism has considerable practical effects. For the ‘mixed system’ conception acts as a 
device for the discrimination between Scots lawyers and non-Scots lawyers, and even for the 
discrimination against non-Scots lawyers, either in practice or in academia, and in this regard 
Scottish Legal Nationalism is quite successful. This also affects the teaching of subjects at 
Scottish Universities, quality assessment of research, career progress and so forth. Obviously, 
                                                     
96 See however the partly reconciling interpretation by K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 610, p. 
487. There is also the problem that the Scottish (Roman) concept of property and the English meaning of 
property (or title?) differ. 
97 D. M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, vol. VI (The Nineteenth Century), (Butterworths, 2001), p. 872-
873: For example, the distinction between sale and agreement to sell, the passing of the risk with the passing of 
ownership, but not delivery (as this was no longer required for the passing of ownership), the distinction 
between conditions and warranties, which were then all different from Scots law. 
98 E.g. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland), p. 540: ‘By the Sale of Goods Act […] [the passing 
of property] constitutes a statutory exception to the general law of Scotland regarding transfer of property in 
moveables.’; F. Davidson, L. J. MacGregor, Commercial Law in Scotland (3rd ed, W. Green, 2014), p. 7: ‘the 
regime which was imposed by the Sale of Goods Act 1893 in relation to the passing of ownership of goods was 
very different from the pre-existing regime under Scots common law ...’ (all my italics). 
99 See A. Rodger, Alan, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’, 108 Law Quarterly Review 
(1992), p. 581-583; Anon., ‘Current Topics: Sale of Goods Bill’, 1 Juridical Review (1889), p. 311. 
100 Compare Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61 (1): “goods” includes … in Scotland all corporeal moveables except 
money … 
101 W. K. Morton, Manual of the Law of Scotland (Green, 1896), p. 239-240. 
102 See the similar situation already in post-classical Roman law, where contract and conveyance began melting 
together into one transaction, M. Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht, Vol. 2 (Die nachklassischen 
Entwicklungen), (2nd edition, C. H. Beck, 1975), p. 275. 
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there is not much written source material on this sensitive issue. However, in 2006, a senior 
legal academic and Scottish Law Commissioner at the time lamented:103 
 
‘The chances that a Scottish-trained applicant will be successful, unless the appointment is tied to Scots 
law, have declined sharply as the academy has become globalised … The Scottish law school has thus 
become … staffed increasingly by those who are not Scottish-trained. (Of course there are also great 
benefits here.)’ 
 
That arguably implies that proper candidates would normally not only be holders of a 
qualifying Scots law degree, but also be Scots, for almost nobody else would seek to obtain a 
qualifying law degree from a small jurisdiction of just over five million inhabitants. Would 
non-Scots nevertheless be encouraged, given that they are perceived to be alien to the 
Scottish legal tradition?104 In reality, Scots are not at all crowded out from Scottish Law 
Schools by wild foreigners. What the author forgot to say is that non-Scots are typically only 
appointed to academic posts at Scottish law faculties if no Scottish candidate of at least 
acceptable quality can be found. If the appointment or promotion of a non-Scot becomes 
indeed inevitable, then that non-Scot might be considered as giving ‘great benefits’ to the law 
school, but, in my experience, rarely in relation to the study of comparative law in 
Scotland.105 At the time that academic’s remarks attracted significant criticism from 
representatives of other Scottish law schools. But the criticism was directed against the 
suggestion of a weakening of the academic qualities of the Scottish law degree as being 
taught by non-Scottish staff, not against the implicit ‘ethnic’106 bias of the original 
statement.107 One should, however, give this particular academic due credit for honestly 
expressing in public what much of Scottish legal academia practises in private. In this area 
the discriminatory element of Scottish Legal Nationalism apparently does show some 
practical achievement. 
 
 
                                                     
103 G. L. Gretton, ‘Legal Science or Law-Lite? Is “Rechtswissenschaft” an alien term?’, Journal of the Law 
Society of Scotland (2006), p. 15. 
104 I posed exactly that question in 2007, see A. Rahmatian, ‘Universalist Norms for a Globalised Diversity: On 
the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions’, in F. Macmillan (ed.), New Directions in Copyright Law, 
vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, 2007), p. 209. 
105 There is also the perception of Scottish academics that non-Scottish academics do not engage sufficiently 
with Scots law, see H. MacQueen, ‘Quo Vadis?’, 1 Juridical Review (2017), p. 14. If that is indeed so, then 
some reasons may be given in the main text above. 
106 The term ‘ethnic’ in this context is a shorthand expression. The idea of a Scottish identity and ethnicity is a 
very complicated one, see e.g. D. McCrone, et al., ‘Who are we? Problematising national identity’, 46 (4) The 
Sociological Review (1998), p. 630, 634. 
107 P. Nicholson, ‘A Debate to Run and Run’, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (2006), p. 16-18. 
17 
 
3 Contradictions: Anti-English but Pro-European Legal Nationalism 
How can this staunchly parochial attitude (with certain segregationist leanings) with which 
Scottish Legal Nationalism imbues the ‘mixed legal system’ idea, be reconciled with a 
Europe-friendly and open approach to comparative law? The solution lies in the belief of 
Scottish legal nationalists that the mix of Civil Law and Common Law that Scots law 
constitutes is an excellent basis for harmonisation projects of private law across Europe. 
Often the flattering statement by the French comparative lawyer Lévi Ullmann after the first 
World War is quoted as a source of justification from outside: ‘Scots law gives us a pleasure 
of what will be some day the law of the civilised nations, namely a combination between the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Continental system’.108 Apparently he did not know the state of affairs 
of Scots law very well; Scots law with its numerous arcane institutions does not necessarily 
present an attractive basis for a Europe-wide harmonisation. Furthermore, neither a possible 
mutual adaptation of Civil and Common Laws, nor a unification of private law in Europe is 
any indicator for a ‘civilised nation’. Rather conversely, I have always regarded the idea of a 
European civil code as seriously misguided.109 The European civil code codification project, 
which has meanwhile probably been abandoned, is a conservative, uncreative, scholarly-
detached, backward-looking venture without a law-reforming force and without taking 
account of the social and economic realities of the twenty-first century.110 It is essentially a 
symbol of a modern form of nationalism. This notion of ‘Europe’ used in the European 
codification debate, with the legal imperialism it effectively entails, is in fact a nationalist 
concept in a version for the twenty-first century, and in its nature and spirit in many ways 
comparable to the nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century in central and eastern 
Europe (such as German nationalism, pan-Slavism).111 From this perspective, the attitudes of 
Scottish Legal Nationalism and of the lawyers promoting a European codification project are 
intellectually by no means far apart. 
Particularly in a globalised world one has to accept irreconcilable contradictions, 
something the philosophical and legal traditions of the Western world have always found 
difficult to grapple with.112 This also applies to the vision of a harmonisation of European 
laws, a program of the European Union which sees further legal integration as a means to 
accomplish political and economic integration. In view of (unsurprising) recent political 
developments, one has to admit that further legal integration is not only impossible to 
achieve, it also gradually undermines the European Union itself, contrary to its professed 
                                                     
108 H. Lévy-Ullmann (trans. F. P. Walton), ‘The Law of Scotland’, 37 Juridical Review (1925), p. 390, cited e.g. 
by H. MacQueen, 29 Int J of Leg Info (2001), p. 310-311. 
109 A. Rahmatian, 8 EdinLR (2004) p. 54. 
110 P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’, 60 Modern Law Review (1997), p. 44, 58-59. 
111 A. Rahmatian, 28(1) JLH (2007), p. 22. 
112 See e.g. the seminal essay by I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Three Critics of 
the Enlightenment (Pimlico, 2000), p. 168-242, at p. 231-239. 
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agenda. More harmonisation can be prejudicial to the European idea. This contradiction is 
what I have called the ‘Herderian paradox’, after the German philosopher and man of letters 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803): the more (imposed) unity in the laws is applied, the 
more the EU Member States will seek to move apart, politically and legally. I have illustrated 
the ‘Herderian paradox’ with the specialised and already significantly harmonised area of 
copyright,113 but these findings apply even more so to any large-scale harmonisation of 
European private law. Particularist Scots lawyers within the UK may well maintain their 
particularism within the European Union, to further, not to jeopardise, the European idea. 
 
 
4 Scottish Legal Nationalism, Scottish Nationalism and Scottish 
Independence 
a)  The relationship between Scottish Legal Nationalism and Scottish Nationalism 
In the last few years major political events have taken place in Britain: the Scottish 
Independence referendum on 18 September 2014, which rejected independence by a fairly 
small margin (55.25% against, 44.65% in favour),114 the general elections to the UK 
Parliament on 7 May 2015, in which the Scottish National Party (SNP), the principal political 
force in the promotion of Scottish independence, gained 56 out of the 59 Scottish seats in the 
Westminster Parliament115 (and lost 21 seats in the 2017 snap-election, but is still the 
strongest Scottish party in Westminster116) and the referendum decision of the UK with 52% 
in favour of leaving the EU on 23 June 2016.117 It is perhaps surprising that these 
fundamental changes in the British and Scottish political landscape have not yet been 
mentioned at all in the discussion of Scottish Legal Nationalism.  
In theory, there need not be much difference between Scottish Nationalism and 
Scottish Legal Nationalism: they share a discriminating or separating/segregating mind-set: 
Scottish/Non-Scottish, Scots Law/English Common Law. It is a them-and-us, Scottish against 
English in particular, and one should name the matter as it is – if one finds this 
uncomfortable, then this is so because it is uncomfortable. There is no nationalism, either 
                                                     
113 A. Rahmatian, ‘European copyright inside or outside the European Union: pluralism of copyright laws and 
the “Herderian paradox”’, 47(8) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2016), p. 
912. 
114 See Scottish Independence referendum, at: http://scotlandreferendum.info/ (accessed 31 March 2017). On the 
legal and political implications of the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum, see e.g. A. Tomkins, ‘Scotland’s 
Choice, Britain’s Future’, 130 Law Quarterly Review (2014), 215. 
115 Electoral Commission, 2015 UK General Election Results, at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk 
(accessed 31 March 2017). 
116 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results (accessed 22 June 2017). 
117 Electoral Commission, EU Referendum Results, at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk (accessed 31 
March 2017). 
19 
 
with special reference to law or in general, which does not aim at a construction of the ‘other’ 
and a separation from it, frequently with the consequence of a supremacist attitude towards 
the other.118 An inclusive nationalism is an oxymoron, like dry water, although the present 
SNP government of Scotland claims to stand for only a ‘civic nationalism’, not ethnic 
nationalism. This seems in principle a better position if one manages to understand what that 
really means.119 Nationalism is reminiscent of the nineteenth century,120 with the most 
horrendous effects in Europe in the twentieth century, and as such a most troubling element 
in the discipline of comparative law. 
Furthermore, the self-understanding of the ‘in-group’ is typically ascertained 
negatively, by unfavourable comparison of the ‘other’ to oneself. So one does not ask 
positively, what is the essence of being ‘Scottish’ or what is really ‘Scots law’, but what it is 
not: not-English, not-English law, mixed instead with a fundamentally Civilian influence, not 
Common Law, not Civil law. The mixture is itself substance of a hardly definable and 
slightly mystical quality, whereby its ingredients (Common Law, Civil Law) are rejected or 
at least a distinction is made between them and the ‘Scottish mix’. But because of its mixité, 
Scots law is supposedly even superior to (apparently non-mixed) Civil Law systems,121 and 
superior to Common Law, or at any rate, irreconcilably different. This special magic of this 
unique mixité, seemingly the only one in Europe, can be understood properly merely by 
insiders, Scots, who are chosen to have the cultural background to see and appreciate this, 
while outsiders, aliens, can naturally never understand that. If one reads the literature of some 
Scots lawyers on issues of Scots law in relation to English law in particular, that is the 
inevitable impression one gets from this intellectual atmosphere, no matter in which way that 
may have  been expressed specifically. Therefore the mixed system conception of Scots law 
would be a useful strategic weapon in the promotion of Scottish political nationalism. 
The real situation is different. The main reason is that Scottish political nationalism 
and Scottish Legal Nationalism in fact operate in different spheres. There are several 
explanations for that. Tony Blair’s ideological reform of the Labour Party contributed 
substantially to the collapse of the Left in Britain, especially in Scotland, and as the result of 
the general elections in 2015 there was only one Labour MP for Scotland in the British 
                                                     
118 See the recent newspaper article by C. Heuchan, ‘The parallels between Scottish nationalism and racism are 
clear’, The Guardian, 27 February 2017. 
119 R. Kiely et al., ‘Birth, blood and belonging: identity claims in post-devolution Scotland’, 53(1) The 
Sociological Review (2005), p. 150. ‘Civic nationalism’ is supposed to be based on citizenship and the rule of 
law, not on biological criteria. 
120 A historic account of Scottish nationalism by G. S. Pryde, ‘The Development of Nationalism in Scotland’, 27 
The Sociological Review (1935), p. 264. 
121 G. L. Gretton, in E. Reid and D. Carey Miller (eds.), A Mixed Legal System in Transition, p. 36 with 
approving reference to T. B. Smith. 
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Parliament.122 But since the 2017 snap elections there are now seven (historically between 
40-50), which may be a sign of slight recovery. In this political situation, the government 
formed by the SNP,123 which represents mostly the current political nationalism, is still able 
to pose, apparently successfully, as an essentially left-wing alternative to the classical Left for 
which Labour historically stood. Legal academics, who are representatives of Scottish Legal 
Nationalism, are, however, for the most part rather conservative, in accordance with the 
romantic antiquarian conservatism that characterises Scottish Legal Nationalism.124 The left-
leaning rhetoric with which the SNP canvasses votes may well be inconvenient to them and 
they may prefer not to be associated too much with SNP political nationalism.125 After it 
became clear, following the EU referendum in 2016, that the UK will leave the EU (‘Brexit’), 
the efforts of the Scottish government – trying to alleviate the effects of ‘Brexit’ or, 
alternatively, to leave the UK to secure EU membership of Scotland in the long run – make 
the academic technicalities of Scottish Legal Nationalism appear increasingly irrelevant. 
Furthermore, Scottish Legal Nationalists were always Europe- and EU-friendly themselves 
(also as a counterpoint to England), so this aspect has been absorbed in political reality 
without specific reference to the (private) law. 
Another reason is that the input of Scottish academic lawyers in the Scottish 
legislature is presently rather limited, so questions of the mixed nature of Scots law with its 
various examples and difficulties remain essentially in academic circles, without any 
influence of this discourse on the law-making. That can only be welcomed, also with regard 
to an SNP government, because for a modern legislator technical problems such as the 
difference between the Scots and the English trust, whether the conveyance of moveable 
property in Scotland is abstract (apparently classical Scots common law) or causal (English 
law-influenced Sale of Goods Act),126 or whether there is a quasi-equitable right in favour of 
purchasers in case of a delayed formal conveyance of land,127 are entirely unimportant. The 
main concerns in governmental and parliamentary practice are typically issues like 
employment, affordable housing, consumer protection, and so on. Very specialist and 
theoretical points of private law which serve as fighting dogs in an ideological debate, are 
                                                     
122 See e.g. BBC News Elections 2015: ‘SNP wins 56 out of 59 seats in Scots landslide’, 8 May 2015, at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32635871 (accessed 31 March 2017). 
123 The SNP formed a minority government in Scotland in 2007, a majority government in 2011 and a minority 
government in 2016. 
124 The same view in L. Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order. Crime and the Genius of Scots law, 
1747 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 37-38. 
125 The SNP was in fact politically not too far away from the Conservatives, and be it only for tactical reasons 
(at least until the resignation of Prime Minister Cameron in 2016 after having lost the ‘Brexit’ referendum), see 
Oliver Wright, ‘Note of French Consul General’s claim that Nicola Sturgeon wanted a Tory win was 
“accurate”’, The Independent, 22 May 2015, and the press release from the Cabinet Office and the Scotland 
Office: ‘Scotland Office memorandum leak: Cabinet Office inquiry statement’, 22 May 2015. 
126 See above under 2. 
127 Sharp v. Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66, and above under 2. 
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naturally and rightly of no relevance outside the small circle of Scottish academic 
specialists.128  
A further ground for the comparative irrelevance of Scottish Legal Nationalism to 
Scottish nationalism is the essentially pluralistic debate of the ‘mixed system’ idea in Scots 
law and of the nature of Scottish Legal Nationalism. Even ardent nationalists seem to be 
scholars first and present their research outcome according to orthodox scholarly methods, 
also where the results do not fit well the nationalistic narrative. For example, T. B. Smith, one 
of the founders of Scottish Legal Nationalism, shows in his opinions many inconsistencies 
with his nationalist stance (‘The rational and the national T. B. Smith’129). But he was unable 
to change or falsify his scholarship in relation to the practical aspects of private law to 
support a nationalistic position. The same applies to the other ‘nationalist’ scholars of Scots 
law, as far as I am able to verify that.130 We have seen that the idea of the ‘mixed system’ is 
not only a conception used for nationalistic purposes but, in some measure, also a device to 
exclude non-Scots from competition in the small market of Scottish legal academics. 
However, it is an entirely different dimension to re-write scholarly research to adapt it to a 
nationalistic ideology. That would be a route Scottish Legal Nationalist academics are, it 
seems, not prepared to take, at least not consciously. The result is a cacophony of different 
voices about Scottish Legal Nationalism and the ‘mixed system’ as its principal concept.  
This cacophony is encouraging, but it disqualifies academic opinion and scholarship 
from obtaining a central role in the making and strengthening of Scottish political 
nationalism. Political ideologies and mass-movements such as Scottish nationalism, currently 
led by the SNP, require simple statements and answers, a straightforward and unsophisticated 
narrative, and a clear aim, irrespective of how romantic and irrational this aim may be. 
Highly specialised academic viewpoints with many different shades, turns in opinion, 
caveats, friendly academic or unfriendly personal battles,131 and, worst of all, intellectual 
erudition and scholarly knowledge for the sake of it, are, fortunately, unsuitable to the 
construction of a legal foundation for political nationalism.  
 
                                                     
128 An instructive example by A. Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots Law’, 1(1) Edinburgh Law Review (1996), p. 3-
24, at p. 9 regarding the legal amendment by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993: ‘The moral seems to be the 
obvious one that people affected by a statutory provision are not concerned with the purity of its legal 
antecedents or with the idea that it embodies some principle of their national law. Understandably enough, they 
are simply concerned with the way in which it affects their own position.’ 
129 G. L. Gretton, in E. Reid and D. Carey Miller (eds.), A Mixed Legal System in Transition, p. 30-31, 39-40. 
130 It is, of course, theoretically possible that I have also been deceived successfully by a nationalistically 
distorting narrative. 
131 E.g. D. Walker, ‘Review of T B Smith, Scotland: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, and: A 
Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland’, 26 Modern Law Review (1963), p. 466-468. 
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b) The role of Scottish Legal Nationalism and Scots law – or the Law of Scotland – in a 
possible independent Scotland after ‘Brexit’ 
A curious result of a successful Scottish political nationalism could be the demise of Scottish 
Legal Nationalism. In the current political climate, an independence of Scotland from the 
United Kingdom is more likely than ever in history. Opinion polls in 2015 after the 
referendum indicated that,132 and the planned ‘Brexit’ of the UK could support this trend.133 
Since Scotland has voted in favour of remaining in the EU in all its constituencies with an 
overall result of 62% in the EU referendum in June 2016, but does not have a veto or a say in 
the ‘Brexit’ negotiations of the UK central government with the EU (the UK Supreme Court 
has confirmed this constitutional position recently134), this may well fuel the endeavours to 
seek Scottish independence, something that is part of the political goals of the nationalist 
SNP government in Scotland anyway. Thus Scotland seceding from the UK to re-join the EU 
at the earliest possibility is not unrealistic at present. After the British Government has 
notified the EU of the UK withdrawing from the EU Treaties according to Art 50 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 29 March 2017, the Scottish Government has, based on a resolution of 
the Scottish Parliament, formally requested an order of the British Government to allow 
legislation to hold a second Scottish Independence referendum, perhaps by the end of 2018, 
or after ‘Brexit’.135  
If the secession of Scotland from the rest of the UK really happens, then the Scottish 
Parliament is – or ought to be136 – the legislator of a new country, and the Acts it passes are 
simply Scots law, since they are the statutes of the nation state of Scotland; the same applies 
to the case law of the Scottish courts. The meaning of the term ‘Scottish law’ or ‘Scots law’ 
would then be the equivalent of the terms ‘Dutch law’ or ‘Italian law’. It would be a matter 
for legal historians to discuss whether Scots law is ‘mixed’, and if so, in which way and from 
when onwards. One would also realise more strongly that Civil Law systems are often also 
                                                     
132 According to a recent poll, there is even a greater percentage in favour of independence than at the time of 
the Independence Referendum in 2014, see Tom Brooks-Pollock, ‘Scottish independence: Poll shows that more 
Scots would vote Yes than at last year's referendum’, The Independent, 25 May 2015. 
133 See e.g. opinion polls by Ipsos MORI, ‘Support for independence rises as referendum speculation grows’, 9 
March 2017. However, opinion polls (as at May 2017) still point towards against independence with a lead of 
about 8-12%. 
134 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 
UKSC 5, para. 150. 
135 David O’Leary, ‘Nicola Sturgeon signs letter asking for second independence referendum’, The Herald, 31 
March 2017. 
136 This insertion is not intended to irritate, but a reaction to the peculiar debate leading to the Independence 
Referendum in 2014, when there was no draft constitution tabled which ought to have been the subject-matter of 
an independence referendum, since it is in law the foundational instrument of a new state. Apparently the Crown 
(‘the Queen’) should have been retained, but its constitutional role was unclear, especially in relation to the 
prerogative powers of the Crown: could a Scottish Government govern on the basis of the prerogative powers of 
the Crown without the Scottish Parliament?  
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mixed, so for example the German law of securities over land,137 or the fusion of droit 
coutumier and the droit écrit in French law.138 The principal purpose of the concept of the 
‘mixed system’, the notional and practical separation of Scots law from English law, would 
become redundant, because Scotland as a new state automatically has a recognised 
independent national law. The ‘mixed system’ conception looses its individualising and 
differentiating purpose. There is currently no indication that any specific notion of Scots law 
and its ‘mixité’ will have a significant relevance in the discourse of general political 
nationalism, be it in a devolved Scotland within the United Kingdom or in an independent 
Scotland. In either case, Scots law will merely be regarded pragmatically as the legal system, 
the body of law of the nation of Scotland, whether or not it will be an independent state in the 
future.  
Whatever the future of Scotland will be, either in the UK or outside (and then perhaps 
in the EU at some point), it seems that Scottish Legal Nationalism has become obsolete, 
particularly after ‘Brexit’. T. B. Smith, the principal academic founder of this ideology, was a 
man of a long by-gone era,139 and so is the mindset and framework of Scottish Legal 
Nationalism. There is still research appearing in praise of T. B. Smith,140 but such pieces 
seem to be the last afterthoughts of an antiquarianism that has rightly faded. Scottish Legal 
Nationalism has promoted research in Scottish legal history and doctrinal law of high 
academic quality (my own research also benefited immensely from that), but these 
achievements no longer need the romantic, nationalistic and antiquarian incitement, if they 
ever needed it at all. If Scotland stays in the UK, the outdated intellectual framework of 
Scottish Legal Nationalism does not assist the further development of modern scholarship in 
Scots law, and if Scotland becomes an independent state, Scottish Legal Nationalism as a 
bulwark against English law will be redundant. In either situation, Scottish Legal Nationalism 
can and should be consigned to history: this will also permit a more disinterested discussion 
of the mixed system of Scots private law. 
 
____________________ 
 
                                                     
137 Difference between the Hypothek and the Grundschuld: both are still regulated in the German BGB, §§ 1113, 
1191, although in practical terms the Grundschuld prevails over the Hypothek by far, see H. Prütting, 
Sachenrecht (33rd ed, C. H. Beck, 2008), p. 262. 
138 K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 75-80, 87-88. 
139 W. A. Wilson’s obituary of T. B. Smith contains some anecdotes – whether these make T. B. Smith appear 
more endearing is for the reader to decide. See W. A. Wilson, ‘Sir Thomas Smith’, The Juridical Review, Part 1 
(1989), p. 1-4. 
140 A. D. MacPherson, ‘T. B. Smith and Max Rheinstein: Letters from America’, 20(1) Edinburgh Law Review 
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